Swimming Against the Tide: The Suspended Sentence Order in England and Wales, 2000-2017 by Irwin-Rogers, Keir & Roberts, Julian V.
137 - IRWIN-ROGERS ROBERTS - SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019 2:05 PM 
 
SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE: 
THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES, 2000–2017 
KEIR IRWIN-ROGERS & JULIAN V. ROBERTS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Suspended sentences of various forms have been an element of western 
sentencing for decades,1 and almost all common law jurisdictions operate some 
form of suspended sanction. Yet of all the alternatives to institutional 
imprisonment, suspended sentences have proved the most problematic. This 
was noted fifty years ago by Leslie Sebba, who identified this sanction as the 
“one form of sentence whose very existence in the penal system is controversial: 
the suspension of execution of sentence and in particular, the suspension of 
sentences of imprisonment.”2 
The essence of the suspended sentence is that “it threatens future 
punishment for past misconduct.”3 Although closer to institutional confinement 
than a community order and therefore more severe, in many regimes, a 
suspended sentence is significantly less onerous than a term of immediate 
imprisonment.4 Suspended sentences are also sometimes described as a means 
for the person being sentenced to avoid any punishment, so long as they desist 
from further offending during the period in which the sentence is suspended. A 
number of jurisdictions have responded to this criticism by requiring suspended 
sentence orders to carry mandatory and optional requirements. While this type 
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 1.  For discussion of representative jurisdictions, see, for example, Peter Tak, Sentencing and 
Punishment in the Netherlands, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188 
(Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001); Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in 
Germany, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188 (Michael Tonry & Richard 
Frase eds., 2001); Josep Cid, Suspended Sentences in Spain: Decarceration and Recidivism, 52 
PROBATION J. 169 (2015). 
 2.  Leslie Sebba, Penal Reform and Court Practice: The Case of the Suspended Sentence, in 21 
STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133 (Israel Drapkin ed., 1969). 
 3.  THOMAS O’MALLEY, SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 642 (3d ed. 2016). 
 4.  See KAREN GELB, THE PERFECT STORM? THE IMPACTS OF ABOLISHING SUSPENDED 
SENTENCES IN VICTORIA (2013). 
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of reform may move the suspended sentence away from its original purpose,5 it 
can also help to promote judicial and community confidence in the sanction. 
Suspended sentence regimes around the world vary greatly, but they can 
broadly be divided into two categories based on the requirements attached to 
the orders. Some versions require people merely to refrain from further 
offending and therefore have the same effect on all those sentenced to the same 
length of order. Others allow courts to impose a range of requirements tailored 
to the specific risks and needs of the individual. The current English suspended 
sentence order falls into the second category. 
The suspended sentence order (SSO) has been available to courts in 
England and Wales since 1967.6 Between 1991 and 2005, courts could impose an 
SSO only in exceptional circumstances; thus the sanction accounted for only a 
small number of cases. Since then, as a result of several reforms, the volume of 
suspended sentences has risen dramatically, from under 3000 in 2004 to over 
40,000 in 2007.7 This is the most dramatic shift in English sentencing practice in 
many decades and is at odds with the experience in some other jurisdictions 
included in this article. The conditional sentence of imprisonment has been 
greatly restricted in Canada, while the suspended sentence has been abolished 
in the Australian state of Victoria. The dramatic increase in usage in England 
and Wales represents a rare change in the use of a sanction and provokes a 
number of important questions, several of which are addressed in this article: 
• Has this alternative to institutional imprisonment reduced the use of 
immediate terms of custody in England and Wales, as envisaged by 
the legislation? Or have we witnessed another example of widening 
of the net? 
• To what extent do trends in the imposition of SSOs converge or 
diverge across offense types and the profiles of those subject to these 
sanctions? 
• Which kinds of requirements are attached to SSOs, and how do 
patterns and trends in SSO requirements compare to those imposed 
as part of a community order? 
• Has the increase in the number of people sentenced to SSOs 
affected breach rates and subsequent admissions to prison? 
A. Overview of Article 
This article explores recent trends relating to the SSO in England and Wales 
and proceeds as follows: Section II briefly summarizes the history of the SSO 
and outlines its current form; Section III presents an analysis of the most recent 
empirical trends over the period 2000–2017 and addresses key questions arising 
 
 5.  MARCEL ANCEL, UNIVERSITÉ DE PARIS, SUSPENDED SENTENCES (1971). 
 6.  Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 39; see ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (6th ed. 2015). 
 7.  See infra Table 1. 
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from the ongoing critique of the sanction; Section IV outlines some 
recommendations for improving the content and implementation of SSOs in 
England and Wales and discusses about the role and utility of the sanction in 
sentencing regimes; and Section V briefly concludes. 
II 
THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER: CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME 
A. Origins, Evolution, and Structure of the Suspended Sentence 
The U.K. Parliament has legislated several key changes to the suspended 
sentence regime in place since 1967.8 In 1991, the availability of the SSO was 
restricted to exceptional cases. Unsurprisingly, this reform reduced the volume 
of such orders imposed from approximately 20,000 in 1990 to only 2500 in 1995.9 
Thereafter, the number of SSOs imposed between 1995–2004 remained 
relatively stable. The most significant recent reforms arose as a result of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003), which resulted in the wholesale 
restructure of penal sanctions implemented in the community.10 Various 
community sentences were combined into a single “Community Order,” with 
sentencers able to choose from a list of twelve possible requirements. The same 
list of requirements was made available for the SSO (discussed further below). 
The CJA 2003 also removed the “exceptional circumstances” restriction in 
Section 5(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
In 2012, Parliament increased the length of the immediate prison sentence 
that could be suspended from twelve to twenty-four months. The Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) also 
removed the condition that all people serving SSOs must be made the subject of 
a requirement.11 The latter amendment was aimed at extending the SSO to 
people whose crimes merited a term of custody but who posed a low risk of 
serious harm and did not have any particular criminogenic needs that might 
otherwise have been addressed by a rehabilitative requirement.12 
 
 8.  While the Criminal Justice Act 1967 contained a mandatory requirement that all sentences of 
imprisonment under six months be suspended unless the case fell within specified exceptions, this fetter 
on judicial discretion was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1972. The main rationale for the 
introduction of the suspended sentence into the sentencing framework at this time was to reduce the 
use of short sentences of imprisonment. See Anthony Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England, 
1967–1978, 21 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981). 
 9.  See GEORGE MAIR, NOEL CROSS & STUART TAYLOR, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUST. STUD., THE 
COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER, THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES OF 
SENTENCERS (2008).  
 10.  Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 177(2A). 
 11.  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10 § 68.  
 12.  LASPO introduced other, less significant changes to the SSO regime. For example, the 
maximum duration of a curfew was extended from six to 12 months, and courts were granted the power 
to impose a fine in response to breach instead of activating and imposing a term of immediate 
imprisonment.   
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The intention of these reforms was to extend the ambit of the SSO and to 
provide greater flexibility to courts in their use of the sanction. In fact, Mair, 
Cross, and Taylor regard the post-2000 amendments as having essentially 
created a brand-new sentence.13 Initial judicial reaction to the changes has been 
mixed. Mair et al. report findings from interviews with a small number of 
sentencers who were divided on the utility of the new sentence. Approximately 
half of the respondents were “generally positive,” while the rest expressed some 
reservations, principally in terms of the volume of orders that were being 
imposed. 
1. Current Structure of the Suspended Sentence Order 
The SSO is defined by Section 188 of the CJA 2003. Sentencers may 
suspend a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years, and not less than 
fourteen days. The sentence may be suspended for a period of between six 
months and two years. This is known as the operational period.  During the 
operational period, if the person subject to the SSO is required to comply with 
one or more conditions, these must be completed within a specified time known 
as the supervision period. The supervision period must be for at least six 
months, and normally the operational and supervision period last for the same 
duration. Failure to comply with one or more of the court-ordered 
requirements during the supervision period may result in the court activating 
the term of imprisonment that was suspended by the original order.14 
As with some other sanctions discussed in this special issue,15 an SSO is a 
custodial sentence. As an SSO is not a high-end alternative to custody, the 
custody threshold must have been crossed prior to the imposition of this 
sanction, and the court must have determined that custody is the only option. 
As with the original statutory framework of the Canadian conditional sentence, 
a court first determines the length of sentence prior to considering whether it 
should be suspended. For example, a court may not replace a one-year term of 
immediate imprisonment with a two-year suspended sentence order. The terms 
of imprisonment must be equivalent in length, whether they are to be served 
immediately or suspended. Whether these terms are served immediately or 
 
 13.  MAIR, CROSS & TAYLOR, supra note 9. 
 14.  The increase in the ceiling of the operational period (from twelve to twenty-four months) was 
intended to increase the number of orders in cases where the crime justified imprisonment, but where it 
was still not in the public interest to institutionalize the person being sentenced.  
 15.  The SSO is similar to, but also different from, the Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment 
(CSI) discussed by Webster and Doob in this issue. See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, 
Missed Opportunities: Canada’s Experience with the Conditional Sentence, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. no. 1, 2019 at 163. The principal distinction between the two sanctions is that although both are 
forms of imprisonment, a person in Canada serving a CSI is serving a sentence of imprisonment. 
Someone serving an SSO in England is not actually discharging a sentence of imprisonment. See 
JULIAN V. ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON: COMMUNITY CUSTODY AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
IMPRISONMENT (Alfred Blumstein & David P. Farrington eds., 2004). Conceptually, this means that, if 
both sanctions were arrayed along the same vertical scale of severity, the SSO should sit beneath the 
CSI, although both are deemed a sentence of imprisonment. 
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suspended does, however, result in manifestly different impacts on the lives of 
those subject to them, an issue involving penal equivalence to which the article 
will return later. 
The CJA 2003 enumerates twelve requirements that may be imposed as part 
of an SSO. They include: unpaid work; an activity requirement; a program 
requirement; a prohibited activity requirement; a curfew; an exclusion 
requirement; a residence requirement; a foreign travel prohibition; mental 
health; drug and alcohol treatment; a supervision requirement; an attendance 
center requirement; and electronic monitoring. The potential requirements 
mirror those that may be imposed as part of a community order. The critical 
difference between the requirements that may be imposed for the two sanctions 
is that all community orders must include a requirement that is imposed for the 
purposes of punishment, whereas SSOs do not. As noted, a 2012 reform16 
removed the obligation for SSOs to contain a requirement, meaning that a 
person subject to an SSO without a requirement must only refrain from further 
offending during the operational period to avoid breaching the sanction. 
III 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE USE OF SUSPENDED SENTENCES 
A. Use of Suspended Sentence Orders, 2000–2017 
This article focuses on the use of the SSO during the period immediately 
prior to and since the 2003 reforms. Table 1 summarizes trends in the use of 
principal sanctions across all courts.17 As illustrated in this table, prior to 2004, 
the use of the SSO was relatively stable, accounting for only a few thousand 
cases and less than 1% of all sanctions imposed. Following the CJA 2003 
reform, there was a surge in the volume of SSOs. By 2005, 9666 SSOs were 
imposed by the courts; and by 2006, the volume of these orders more than 
tripled to 33,509. The number continued to rise over the next decade, peaking 
in 2015. In 2017, the most recent year for which data are available, 53,148 SSOs 
were imposed, representing 4.4% of all sentenced cases. 
  
 
 16.  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10 § 68.  
 17.  There are two levels of trial court in England and Wales. All cases originate in the magistrates’ 
courts and almost all (approximately 95%) are resolved there. The remainder are transferred to the 
Crown Court for trial and/or sentencing. The sentencing powers of lower courts are restricted to a 
maximum of six months of imprisonment for a single count. 
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 There is a similar pattern in the Crown Court, where the most serious cases 
are sentenced. The number of SSOs rose from 1539 in 2004 to 20,772 in 2017. 
More significantly, the percentage of cases attracting an SSO rose from 2% in 
2004 to 27% in 2017. In terms of the percentage of all custodial sentences, 
immediate and suspended combined, SSOs accounted for 32% in 2017, up from 
3% in 2004.18 This dramatic shift in English sentencing has attracted little 
attention from the media, although occasionally tabloid newspapers have 
condemned the increased use of suspended sentences, particularly in the 
context of violent crimes or persistent offenders. One headline drew attention 
to the use of SSOs for repeat offenders: “Almost 12,000 criminals walked free 
from court with suspended sentences last year – despite having 10 or more past 
convictions.”19 
B. Widening of the Net? 
Where have all the additional SSOs come from? For decades, scholars have 
documented a tendency for the courts to use suspended sentences of 
imprisonment in place of high-end community orders, thus undermining the 
primary purpose of the sanction—namely, replacing terms of immediate 
imprisonment.20 The data summarized in Table 1 suggest that the net-widening 
noted by these scholars has persisted. Since the suspended sentence is a form of 
custody, which should only be imposed after a court has determined that the 
custody threshold has been crossed, the revitalized SSO should have reduced 
rates of immediate prison sentences. At least from a long-term perspective, this 
appears not to have been the case. The rate of sentences of immediate 
imprisonment across all courts remained relatively stable over the period 2004–
2017, from 6.9% to 7.2% of cases. Second, the rate of community orders across 
all courts declined 52% over the same period, from 13% of cases in 2004 to 
7.9% in 2017. The shifting pattern of sanctions can be seen to an even greater 
extent in the Crown Court, where the rate of community orders declined from 
30% in 2004 to 6.7% in 2017. 
 
 18.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY, Crown Court 
data tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-
december-2017 [https://perma.cc/WNJ5-8X9R].   
 19.  See Daily Mail Reporter, DAILY MAIL, May 10, 2014, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-2625103/Almost-12-000-criminals-walk-free-court-suspended-sentences-despite-having-10-
previous-convictions.html [https://perma.cc/NF7L-EB7F]. To date, the broadsheet newspapers in 
England have overlooked this aspect of current sentencing practice. 
 20.  See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 318–22 (William Twining, 
Christopher McCrudden & Bronwen Morgan eds., 6th ed. 2015); Carol Hedderman & Rebecca Barnes, 
Sentencing Women: An Analysis of Recent Trends, in EXPLORING SENTENCING PRACTICE IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 93 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2015); Anthony Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in 
England, 1967–1978, 21 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1981). For a review of the international experience 
with suspended sentences, see SARAH ARMSTRONG, GILL MCIVOR, FERGUS MCNEILL & PAUL 
MCGUINESS, SCOTTISH CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
REVIEW OF CONDITIONAL (SUSPENDED) SENTENCES: FINAL REPORT (2013). 
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Data on previous convictions highlights the potential for SSOs to result in 
net-widening. As SSOs ought to be imposed only in cases where the offense has 
crossed the custody threshold, one might expect the previous convictions 
profiles of people sentenced to SSOs to be closer to those receiving immediate 
sentences of custody than those receiving community orders. This is not, 
however, borne out by the data. In 2016, the previous conviction profiles of 
people subject to SSOs were closer to those of people subject to community 
orders than those subject to sentences of imprisonment. Moreover, individuals 
subject to SSOs actually had fewer previous convictions, on average, than those 
subject to community orders.21 This provides a strong indication that individuals 
sentenced to SSOs are being drawn primarily from a cohort who, absent the 
existence of SSOs, would otherwise have received community orders as 
opposed to sentences of immediate imprisonment. 
Taking a long-term perspective on sentencing trends and looking across all 
courts, however, might serve to mask some notable changes over shorter 
periods. Between 2004 and 2007 in the Crown Court, for example, there does 
appear to have been a significant degree of decarceration associated with the 
initial rise of suspended sentences. While 61% of cases received a sentence of 
immediate imprisonment in 2004, this had declined to 56% by 2007.22 During 
the same period, suspended sentences rose from 2% to 19% of all cases. 
Although this indicates some degree of decarceration, net-widening also 
appeared to take place during this time, as the rate of community orders 
declined from 30% to 18%. 
Finally, an indication of both decarceration and net-widening can be seen by 
looking at the correlation coefficients for SSOs and community orders, and 
SSOs and sentences of immediate imprisonment. Between 2004–2017, across all 
courts, there was a moderate to strong negative relationship between both SSOs 
and community orders (-.68) and SSOs and sentences of immediate 
imprisonment (-.62).23 While these coefficients, as well as the aggregate statistics 
discussed above, provide preliminary indications of the likely impact of SSOs 
on other disposals, they do not account for any potential exogenous factors that 
might mediate these relationships. To estimate more precisely the extent to 
which SSOs have led to decarceration or net-widening, further in-depth analysis 
 
 21.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO 
DECEMBER 2016, Offending History Data Tool: Sanction tatistics (2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-
december-2016 [https://perma.cc/4269-FFE2]. 
 22.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 
2014, Crown Court data tool (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-
statistics-quarterly-december-2014 [https://perma.cc/6RZY-KMMZ]. 
 23.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 
2017, Overview tables (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-
statistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/JF86-P33A]; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2014, Overview tables (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2014 
[https://perma.cc/TGM2-H3K2].  
137 - IRWIN-ROGERS ROBERTS - SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  2:05 PM 
No. 1 2019] SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE 145 
of sentencing trends is needed. This research should control for exogeneous 
factors, such as shifts in the rates of different offence types coming before the 
courts. 
To the extent that net-widening has occurred over the period 2004–2017, the 
cause is puzzling. It is unclear why a court, liberated from using an SSO except 
in exceptional circumstances, would turn its attention to cases formerly 
sentenced to a community order, particularly in light of the guidance issued by 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2004.24 Low levels of judicial confidence in 
community orders may supply part of the answer. 
Community penalties have struggled to attract the confidence of the courts 
or the legislature in England and Wales. One manifestation of this lack of 
confidence is the reform introduced in 2003 when Parliament legislated that all 
community orders must contain at least one requirement imposed for the 
purposes of punishment.25 This controversial step was taken in order to correct 
a perception that community orders were purely rehabilitative in nature and 
had no punitive impact on those receiving them. If courts did lack confidence in 
even high-end community orders with many demanding requirements, the new 
freedom to impose instead a term of imprisonment, albeit suspended, might 
have proved welcome—hence the increase in SSOs accompanied by a 
simultaneous drop in the volume of community orders. 
1. Guideline on the Use of Suspended Sentence Orders 
These data, suggesting that courts were using the SSO for cases which might 
otherwise have attracted a community order rather than immediate 
imprisonment, demonstrate that previous guidance has failed to correct a long-
standing misapplication of the sanction. In 2004, the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council, the statutory body responsible for issuing sentencing guidelines at the 
time, issued a guideline for a number of sanctions, including the newly amended 
SSO. That guideline stressed that, prior to imposing an SSO, courts must 
already have decided that a prison sentence is justified, with the clear 
implication that an SSO would replace a term of immediate imprisonment and 
not a community order.26 This guidance appears to have fallen on deaf ears. 
Awareness of the continuing misapplication of the suspended sentence 
order led the Sentencing Council of England and Wales (SCEW) to issue 
further guidance on the use of this and other sanctions.27 In 2016, the SCEW 
 
 24.  NEW SENTENCES: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, § 2.2.12 (SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COUNCIL 2003). 
 25.  Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 177(2A). 
 26.  NEW SENTENCES: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003, § 2.2.12 (SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COUNCIL 2003). 
 27.  The Sentencing Council issues offense-specific and generic guidelines, and all courts have a 
statutory duty to follow any relevant guideline unless it “would be contrary to the interests of justice to 
do so.” Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c. 25 § 125(1). See Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines and 
Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2011). 
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issued a definitive guideline for the use of principal sanctions, including the 
SSO.28 The guideline, applicable to anyone sentenced on or after February 1, 
2017, makes it clear that an SSO should not be imposed in place of anything 
other than a term of immediate custody: 
A suspended sentence MUST NOT be imposed as a more severe form of community 
order. A suspended sentence is a custodial sentence. Sentencers should be clear that 
they would impose an immediate custodial sentence if the power to suspend were not 
available. If not, a non-custodial sentence should be imposed.29 
The guideline also provides some guidance regarding the factors that should 
incline a court towards or away from a suspended sentence, if the custody 
threshold has been passed.30 The most recent development came in May 2018, 
when the Chair of the Sentencing Council sent a memo to courts across the 
country warning them against imposing the SSO as a more severe form of 
community order.31 While the next batch of sentencing statistics is required 
before the likely impact of these interventions becomes apparent, data from 
2017 provide a preliminary indication that the interventions may be having their 
desired effects: across all courts, there was a marginal fall in the rates of SSOs 
and sentences of immediate imprisonment, accompanied by a deceleration in 
the decline of community orders. 
C. Profiles of People Receiving an SSO 
The increase in SSOs was relatively consistent for males and females. In 
2000, 1% of both males and females received an SSO.32 In 2017, 17% of males 
and 19% of females convicted of indictable offenses across all courts received 
an SSO.33 This finding—that the SSO is being used at similar rates for males and 
females—is consistent with earlier research.34 The absence of any significant 
divergence is surprising since the SSO is particularly appropriate for those 
 
 28. IMPOSITION OF COMMUNITY AND CUSTODIAL SENTENCES. DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 
(SENTENCING COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2017). 
 29.  Id. at 7.  
 30.  There are three factors cited that oppose the use of an SSO: offender poses a risk; only 
immediate imprisonment is sufficient; and the offender has a history of noncompliance. Similarly, three 
factors that should incline a court to impose the order are also cited: a realistic prospect of 
rehabilitation; strong person mitigation; and immediate custody would result in significant harmful 
impact upon others. See IMPOSITION OF COMMUNITY AND CUSTODIAL SENTENCES DEFINITIVE 
GUIDELINE, p. 8 (SENTENCING COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2017). 
 31.  In his letter, the Chairman noted that: “There is evidence that suspended sentence orders, 
which are custodial sentences, are sometimes being imposed incorrectly as a more severe form of 
community order.” See Letter from Lord Justice Treacy, Chairman of the Sentencing Council for 
England and Wales, to John Witherow, Editor, The Times, (May 2, 2018). 
 32.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING STATISTICS (ANNUAL), Sentencing Statistics 
supplementary tables (2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sentencing-statistics-annual-ns 
[https://perma.cc/U7G8-C4W4].  
 33.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 
2017, Outcomes by offence tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-
system-statistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/AHK7-BWCH]. 
 34.  SUNITA PATEL & STEPHEN STANLEY, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES, THE USE OF 
THE COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER FOR WOMEN (2008). 
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convicted of an offense of sufficient seriousness to justify custody, but where 
there is significant personal mitigation or where immediate custody would have 
a significant harmful impact upon others. Being a primary caregiver for young 
children is one common such factor, and women are significantly more likely to 
be in this position.35 
As shown in Table 2, in 2017, across all courts and in relation to indictable 
offenses, the highest rates of SSOs relative to other disposals were imposed for 
violent offenses (24%), possession of weapons (27%), and fraud (26%). The 
lowest rates of SSOs were imposed for robbery (6%), drug offenses (11%), and 
theft (13%). These patterns were relatively similar for males and females.36 
 
  
 
 35.  STATISTA, Lone Parent Families in the United Kingdom 2017, by Parent’s Gender (2018) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/281640/lone-parent-families-in-the-united-kingdom-uk-by-gender/  
[https://perma.cc/UM49-5SNU]. 
 36.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS QUARTERLY: DECEMBER 2017, 
Outcomes by offence tool (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-
statistics-quarterly-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/KEU7-D8EY]. 
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D. Analysis of the Requirements Attached to Suspended Sentence Orders 
One critical issue relating to noncustodial sentences in various jurisdictions 
is the nature and onerousness of the requirements attached to sanctions 
implemented in the community. A recurring criticism of community penalties, 
conditional sentences of imprisonment, and suspended sentences is that the 
absence of demanding conditions diminishes the penal weight and character of 
the sanction. This criticism is particularly acute with respect to sanctions such as 
the Canadian conditional sentence and the English SSO since both are 
considered forms of imprisonment, rather than alternatives to custody.37 A 
common critique of both sanctions is that they carry minimal penal weight and 
are not, therefore, equivalent to the sentence of custody that they displace. If 
this is true, the imposition of an SSO in place of immediate imprisonment is 
likely to undermine parity and proportionality as well as public confidence in 
the sanction more generally. 
Table 3 summarizes the pattern of requirements attached to an SSO in 2010 
and 2017. The vast majority of SSOs have either one or two requirements 
attached to them. The most prevalent of these requirements by far are 
supervision and unpaid work. It is important to note that the Offender 
Rehabilitation Act 201438 introduced the Rehabilitation Activity Requirement 
to replace both the supervision and specific activity requirements, which 
accounts for the significant decline of the latter between 2010 and 2017. 
Interestingly, the provisions in LASPO 2012, which enabled SSOs to be 
imposed without specific requirements beyond the condition not to commit a 
further offense, did not result in any significant change in the average number 
of requirements attached to SSOs, indicating that the courts are handing down 
relatively few requirement-free SSOs. 
Many of the potential requirements are used sparingly. Table 3 shows that 
even those addressing common criminogenic triggers, such as alcohol and drug 
treatment, were attached in fewer than 10% of all cases. The 2017 data reveal 
no significant difference between the types of requirement attached to SSOs 
and those attached to community orders. Similarly, the same dataset shows no 
significant difference between the number of requirements attached to SSOs, 
averaging 1.6, and the number attached to community orders, averaging 1.5.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37.  Although as noted the CSI is actually discharged whereas the SSO is suspended. 
 38.  Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014, c. 11, sch. 5 (Eng).   
 39.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO 
DECEMBER 2017 (2018). https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-
quarterly-october-to-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/AZ7M-FWEZ].  
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Table 3: Requirements attached to a Suspended Sentence Order, 2010 and 2017 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS QUARTERLY: OCTOBER TO 
DECEMBER 2017, Probation: 2017, tbl. A4.10 (2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/ 
offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2017 [https://perma.cc/DY4Q-SALY] 
(percentages rounded). 
 
One explanation for the relatively low use of some requirements, 
particularly drug and treatment orders, is judicial awareness of the likelihood of 
noncompliance leading to breach and committal to custody.40 Probation officers 
overseeing the implementation of SSOs have also highlighted that while many 
requirements—such as alcohol treatment, attendance center requirements and 
mental health treatment requirements—are available in theory, they have been 
unavailable in practice due to a lack of resources.41 Probation officers have 
reported this being a particular cause for concern given the links between their 
clients’ offending behavior and problems around alcohol abuse and mental 
health. By diminishing their penal character, the relatively low number of 
requirements attached to SSOs—whether for reasons of breach or lack of 
availability—is likely to undermine public, political, and judicial confidence in 
the sanction.42 
 
 40.  GEORGE MAIR, NOEL CROSS & STUART TAYLOR, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES, 
THE USE AND IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER 28 
(2007). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See infra Section IV.  
 2010 2017 
Supervision 66% 5% 
Rehabilitation Activity 
Requirement 
--% 65% 
Unpaid Work 50% 47% 
Accredited Program 23% 14% 
Curfew 17% 16% 
Specified Activity 10% <1% 
Drug Treatment 8% 8% 
Alcohol Treatment 5% 1% 
Other requirements (including 
prohibited activity; exclusion; 
mental health; electronic 
monitoring; attendance center 
and residential requirements) 
 
<1% <1% 
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E. Compliance, Breach, and Deterrence 
An important concern arising from the use of SSOs, particularly if a 
significant proportion draw upon cases that would otherwise have received 
community orders, is the rate at which these orders are breached and 
terminated early. If SSOs are associated with a high termination rate for breach, 
the prison population will increase accordingly. The termination rate is likely to 
be affected by the ambit of the sanction and its use by the courts. A highly 
selective application is likely to result in a low breach rate, as courts select 
primarily the lowest-risk cases for an SSO. As the ambit broadens, so too may 
the volume of higher-risk cases. This is notable in light of the recent 2012 
reform, which raised the cap on terms of imprisonment that SSOs can displace 
from one to two years. 
Before reviewing trends in SSO termination and compliance rates, it is 
useful to place breach statistics in a wider context of recidivism research. The 
U.K. Ministry of Justice has conducted extensive multivariate research to 
explore the relationship between different sanctions and recidivism rates.43 
More specifically, the research compared recidivism rates for short custodial 
sentences, SSOs, and community orders, using a large cohort and applying 
propensity score matching. Results demonstrate that people sentenced to an 
SSO had the lowest recidivism rates of the three sanctions, with the greatest 
difference in rates emerging between immediate custody and SSOs. For each 
cohort studied, the one-year reoffending rate was highest for those sentenced to 
short-term custody. Similar trends have emerged in other jurisdictions. Lulham, 
Weatherburn, and Bartels report data from New South Wales showing that, 
after matching for key background variables, people sentenced to prison 
reoffended more quickly after release than comparable individuals sentenced to 
a suspended sentence.44 
In England and Wales, the escalating use of the SSO between 2006 and 2017 
was accompanied by a significant decline in breach rates for both 
noncompliance with SSO conditions and conviction for a subsequent offense. In 
2006, over half of SSOs were terminated for either noncompliance or 
reconviction. By 2017, this had declined to less than a third. The most 
significant decline occurred in relation to breach rates for noncompliance: from 
a high of 28% in 2006, breach rates for noncompliance dropped to 12% in 2009 
and remained relatively stable thereafter. Concomitantly, the percentage of 
SSOs that ran their full course or were terminated early for good progress rose 
dramatically, from 37% in 2006 to 71% in 2017.45 These trends suggest that the 
increase in the use of SSOs has not created a significant additional threat to the 
community. 
 
 43.  AIDAN MEWS ET AL., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF SHORT CUSTODIAL SENTENCES, 
COMMUNITY ORDERS AND SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDERS ON RE-OFFENDING (2015). 
 44.  Rohan Lulham, Don Weatherburn & Lorana Bartels, The Recidivism of Offenders Given 
Suspended Sentences: A Comparison With Full-Time Imprisonment, 136 CRIME & JUST. BULL. 1 (2009).   
 45.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 39.  
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To the extent that burgeoning SSO caseloads reflect an increase in the 
number of people who would otherwise have received community orders, 
probation officers tasked with responding to noncompliance might have been 
reluctant to instigate breach proceedings with the knowledge that these people 
would likely be sent to prison to serve their sentence.46 Indeed, research on 
penal sanctions implemented in the community has highlighted that rates of 
compliance may be more dependent on particular compliance policies and 
professional discretion than the actual behavior of those subject to these 
sanctions.47 Given that the decline in rates of compliance occurred at the same 
time as a significant shift in the profiles of those receiving SSOs, however, 
compliance rates might also have been shaped to some extent by a shift in the 
overall propensity of this cohort to comply with the conditions of these 
sentences. 
Deterrence is not cited as a justification for the imposition of SSOs over and 
above other disposals in current U.K. legislation or SCEW guidance. The 
potential for these sentences to deter people from reoffending has, however, 
been noted by U.K. politicians, as well as by researchers and legislators in other 
jurisdictions.48 It is, therefore, worth examining the links between the severity of 
SSOs and the likelihood of noncompliance and reconviction. A Freedom of 
Information Act Request revealing data on SSO terminations between 2012–
2016 showed little variation in termination rates over time. 49 This provides a 
preliminary indication that the LASPO 2012 provisions enabling courts to 
impose fines upon breach, as opposed to termination and activation, has not 
had a significant impact in practice. SSO termination rates varied widely across 
different offense categories. In 2016, for example, the highest termination rate 
for reconvictions and noncompliance combined was 52% for theft and handling 
offenses, compared to only 13% for sexual offenses. 
The same data provide an insight, albeit limited, into the potential 
differential deterrent effect of SSOs based on their severity. Dividing SSOs into 
a relatively lenient category, under one-year custodial term, and a relatively 
severe category, one-year and over custodial term, revealed considerable 
variation in noncompliance and reconviction rates. In relation to 
noncompliance with SSO conditions, there is a higher termination rate 
associated with the relatively lenient category of SSOs. For SSOs with a 
custodial term of under one year imposed for burglary offenses, for example, 
the termination rate for noncompliance was 19%. In contrast, for SSOs with a 
 
 46.  See GEORGE MAIR & HELEN MILLS, CTR. FOR CRIME & JUSTICE STUDIES, THE 
COMMUNITY ORDER AND THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE ORDER THREE YEARS ON: THE VIEWS AND 
EXPERIENCES OF PROBATION OFFICERS AND OFFENDERS (2009). 
 47.  Gwen Robinson, What Counts? Community Sanctions and the Construction of Compliance, in 
WHAT WORKS IN OFFENDER COMPLIANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICE 26 (Pamela Ugwudike & Peter Raynor eds., 2013). 
 48.  Loraine Bartels, The Weight of the Sword of Damocles: A Reconviction Analysis of Suspended 
Sentences in Tasmania, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 72 (2009). 
 49.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST 180307001 (2018). 
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custodial term of one year and over, the termination rate for noncompliance 
was just 13%. For violent offenses, the figures were 11% and 8% respectively. 
It is of course possible that these findings are not the product of an 
enhanced deterrent effect associated with longer SSOs, but of professional 
discretion in enforcement of noncompliance—specifically, the reluctance of 
probation officers to breach an SSO that will result in relatively severe 
consequences for the person serving it. However, there is a similar pattern in 
relation to breach and revocation for further offenses. For SSOs with a 
custodial term of under one year imposed for violent offenses, 17% were 
terminated for a further offense, whereas for those with a custodial term of one 
year and over, the termination rate was just 12%. For burglary offenses, the 
figures were 26% and 20% respectively. Comparable patterns were observed 
across other offense types. 
Had the differences in breach and revocation rates been found only in 
relation to noncompliance, these may have been attributable solely to variation 
in the way professionals exercised their discretion around enforcement. Given 
that the same pattern was found in relation to further offenses, however, the 
data on SSO breach and revocation provide at least a preliminary indication 
that relatively lengthy and severe SSOs may exert an enhanced deterrent effect 
in relation to both reoffending and noncompliance. Further analysis controlling 
for factors such as the differential offending profiles of those subject to SSOs, 
however, is needed to scrutinize these statistics and control for exogenous 
factors that could be contributing to the observed variation. 
IV 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
A. Summary 
Between 2004–2017, the volume and rate of SSOs increased rapidly. While 
the aggregate sentencing statistics indicate that the initial expansion of SSOs led 
to the displacement of sentences of immediate imprisonment, constituting a 
process of decarceration, in the years that followed SSOs increasingly appeared 
to displace community orders, constituting net-widening. Further in-depth 
analysis controlling for shifts in offense types and examining short-term trends 
is required before definitive conclusions can be drawn on this issue. 
The requirements attached to SSOs are broadly similar to those attached to 
community orders: the vast majority of both contain either one or two 
requirements. By far the most prevalent of these requirements are supervision 
and unpaid work. There is little difference in the rates at which courts impose 
SSOs on males and females. 
Rates of compliance across SSOs and community orders are broadly 
comparable, with successful completion rates for SSOs increasing markedly 
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between 2006 (37%) and 2017 (71%).50 This is likely to reflect changes in 
compliance policies and practices, as opposed to any substantive change in the 
behavior of those subject to these sanctions. Terminations rates for 
noncompliance vary widely depending on offense type: for example, in 2016, 
theft and handling offenses had a relatively high termination rate of 52%, 
whereas the termination rate for sexual offenses was just 13%. Although 
further analysis controlling for exogenous factors is needed before firm 
conclusions can be drawn, the available data provide a preliminary indication 
that relatively severe SSOs might lead to lower termination rates for 
noncompliance and new offenses compared to relatively lenient SSOs. 
B. Finding a Place for the Suspended Sentence Order 
The evidence discussed in this article suggests that the courts in England and 
Wales have often misapplied the SSO, displacing community orders instead of 
sentences of immediate imprisonment. However, this article does not endorse 
the abolitionist position taken in Victoria, Australia.51 The question is whether 
there is some penal space for the SSO between an executed custodial sentence 
and a noncustodial sanction. This article proposes that there is a role for a 
sanction of this kind within the sentencer’s toolkit, and argues that there are 
crimes of sufficient seriousness to justify imprisonment, but which are 
committed under particular circumstances, or by particular people, which justify 
suspension of the sentence. It seems excessively restrictive to argue that because 
imprisonment is justified, it must also be executed. 
Few sanctions have attracted as much criticism over the years as the 
suspended sentence. Moreover, such criticism has emerged from academics,52 as 
well as the mass media,53 politicians, and lobby groups. A central element of 
most critiques is that the suspended sentence is a deceptive sanction: while it 
represents itself as a form of imprisonment—with the statutory framework and 
legal guidance treating it as a term of custody—it falls short of having the same 
impact on the lives of those subject to it. Other, similar forms of suspended 
sanction attract a comparable degree of criticism. The most common criticism of 
the conditional sentences of imprisonment in Canada was that someone serving 
a CSI was deemed to be serving a sentence of imprisonment, when in fact they 
spent their sentence in their own home.54 
 
 50.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 39.   
 51.  See Arei Freiberg, Suspended Sentences in Australia: Uncertain, Unstable, Unpopular and 
Unnecessary?, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2019 at 81. 
 52.  E.g., Mirko Bagaric, Suspended Sentences and Preventive Sentences: Illusory Evils and 
Disproportionate Punishments, U. N.S.W. L.J. 534 (1999); Freiberg, supra note 51. For a recent and 
comprehensive discussion of the suspended sentence, see Tom O’Malley, That Measure of Wise 
Clemency: Defending the Suspended Sentence, 28 IRISH CRIM. L.J. 39 (2018). 
 53.  See supra note 19. 
 54.  See Webster & Doob, supra note 15. 
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One of the objectives of the Supreme Court judgment in Proulx55 was to 
ensure a closer correspondence between the onerousness of a conditional 
sentence and the term of immediate custody that it had replaced. That 
judgment directed courts to ensure that all conditional sentences should carry 
punitive conditions; conditions designed to promote rehabilitation or 
restorative justice were insufficient. In addition, the Court abandoned the one-
to-one correspondence between a conditional sentence and the term of 
institutional imprisonment it replaced. Henceforth a court could impose, for 
example, an eighteen-month conditional sentence instead of a six-month term 
of custody.56 
Penal interventions need to be diverse and protean. The diversity of 
offending and of those sentenced requires sanctions that permit a high degree 
of individualization. A sanction regime with only a limited number of penalties, 
for example, a fine, probation, or prison, would lack the necessary flexibility. 
There is a clear a priori attraction to creating a wide range of sanctions for 
courts to deploy at sentencing. To this we add two caveats. First, all sanctions 
need to carry a degree of what we might call penal validity: they need to affect 
the person subject to them in a way that the community would expect; or at 
least, sanctions cannot have an impact greatly at odds with community 
expectations. Imagine the following regime of fines. A person is ordered to pay 
£5,000, a sum which is commensurate with the gravity of their conduct and their 
means to pay. However, the payment may be made at any point up to ten years 
after it is imposed, and the person subject to the fine may reduce their financial 
liability by applying a wide range of income-tax deductions (for children; 
mortgage relief, etc.). A fine implemented in this form would lack penal validity 
as a sanction.57 Equally, a suspended sentence regime must attract the 
confidence of the community, or it will be less likely to be used by courts. 
1. Suspended Sentence Orders and the Principle of Penal Restraint 
It is important to note a foundational sentencing principle that underpins 
the use of sanctions such as the SSO: the principle of penal restraint, or 
parsimony at sentencing. This principle requires that the courts should impose 
the least onerous sanction that achieves the purposes of sentencing. The 
principle of penal restraint has been placed on a statutory footing in a wide 
range of common law jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the principle is 
reflected in the statutory requirement that imprisonment be imposed only if no 
lesser sentence is appropriate: “The court must not pass a custodial sentence 
unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the offence 
 
 55.  R. v. Proulx, [2000] S.C.R. 61 (Can.). 
 56.  See Julian V. Roberts & Patrick Healy, Recent Developments in Conditional Sentencing, 80 
CANADIAN B. REV. 1035 (2001). 
 57.  A more realistic example would be a regime where the maximum fine was, say $100. Few 
employed offenders would experience any discomfort. 
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and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine 
alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.”58 
The Canadian version of the restraint principle is at once clearer and more 
relevant to the use of different sanctions, including an SSO: Sections 718.2(d)-
(e) of the Criminal Code states that “an offender should not be deprived of 
liberty, if less restrictive alternatives may be appropriate in the circumstances; 
and (e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment should be considered 
for all offenders.” This wording focuses a court’s attention on the sanctions less 
severe than immediate imprisonment, including forms of imprisonment that are 
either suspended, as in England and Wales, or served in the community as a 
conditional sentence of imprisonment, as in Canada. 
Restraint is a simple principle, albeit one that is a challenge to 
operationalize. The academic critique of the custody threshold in this 
jurisdiction is that it is insufficiently robust to prevent the imposition of custody 
in cases where a noncustodial alternative would be sufficient.59 Providing courts 
with a multiplicity of sanctions is one way of promoting the application of the 
restraint principle. An SSO offers an additional option to courts contemplating 
cases that have only just passed the custody threshold or that are more serious 
but where there are unusual or particularly compelling sources of mitigation. 
Cases in the first category are particularly appropriate candidates as they would 
involve relatively short sentences of imprisonment which can be readily 
replaced by an SSO. Seen in this light, the SSO contributes to promoting 
restraint and to underscoring the message that institutional imprisonment 
should be reserved for those who represent a significant risk or those convicted 
of a crime the gravity of which means that a noncustodial alternative would 
entail a violation of ordinal proportionality requirements. 
C. Reforming the Current Regime in England and Wales 
We now offer two main reforms to ensure the SSO fulfills its primary 
purpose of reducing the number of short custodial sentences,60 while also 
attracting the confidence of all stakeholders. 
1. Enhancing the Operational Period of the SSO 
Since the SSO purports to be a sentence of imprisonment, its legitimacy is 
put at risk if these orders are perceived to be a soft option that entail 
significantly less punitive weight than the immediate sentences of imprisonment 
they are designed to displace. Central to our recommendations, therefore, is a 
requirement that the SSO carry a degree of penal validity, in terms of its 
 
 58.  Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 § 152(2). 
 59.  See Nicola Padfield, Time to Bury the Custody Threshold?, 8 CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2011); Julian 
V. Roberts & Lyndon Harris, Reconceptualizing the Custody Threshold in England and Wales, 28 
CRIM. L.F. 477 (2017). 
 60.  HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE COMMITTEE, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE SENTENCING: FIFTH 
REPORT OF SESSION 2007–08 VOLUME 1, 2008, HC 186–I (2008). 
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statutory platform, its impact on the person subject to it, and its relation to 
other sanctions. 
In this regard, the experience with an ancillary sanction in Canada, the CSI, 
is instructive. The original statutory framework, which determined the nature of 
conditional sentences actually imposed and served, was flawed and rightly 
attracted much public and media criticism. One obvious weakness of the 
legislation was that a CSI had to be the same length as the term of institutional 
imprisonment it replaced. Since time at home is unlikely to carry the same 
punitive weight as time in a penal institution, this one-to-one correspondence 
was potentially fatal to the public image of the sanction, as well as the principle 
of parity at sentencing.61 The appellate courts were not slow to react to the 
problem. In a guideline judgment in 2001, the Supreme Court decoupled the 
length of a CSI from the term of straight imprisonment it would replace.62 
This approach could be followed in England and Wales. Courts could be 
allowed to enhance the length of SSOs so that they exceed the duration of the 
immediate sentences of imprisonment they displace. One of the potential issues 
with this option, however, would be the consequences of breach and 
termination of the SSO. Consider the case of someone convicted of domestic 
burglary warranting a two-year sentence of immediate imprisonment, but for 
which the judge has reason to suspend the sentence. If the suspended term of 
custody was enhanced to three years and the person breached the SSO within a 
week of its commencement, would it be just to subject them to three years of 
imprisonment, given that the original offence warranted only a two-year prison 
sentence? 
An alternative, of which we are in favor, would be to leave unchanged the 
suspended term of imprisonment, but to enhance the SSO’s operational period. 
While it is difficult to compare the punitive bite of time served in custody with 
time served in the community, we suggest that a 1:2 ratio of imprisonment 
versus time served in the community is straightforward and likely to command 
greater public and court confidence than the current legislation that gives courts 
the discretion to suspend SSOs for any period not less than six months and not 
more than two years. Guidance from the Sentencing Council suggests that the 
operational period should reflect the length of the sentence, citing an example 
that echoes our suggested 1:2 ratio. However, we would highlight that the courts 
are not bound by this ratio, nor indeed are they currently able to impose an 
operational period twice the length of the custodial term they are displacing in 
cases where this term exceeds one year.63 
 
 61.  We use the term “unlikely” advisedly because there will be cases where the subjective 
experience of a CSI is the equivalent of a term of immediate imprisonment. See discussion in Roberts & 
Healy, supra note 56. In all likelihood the same cannot be said for the SSO in England and Wales. 
 62.  R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61. 
 63.  The current maximum limit that restricts operational periods to a duration of no more than 
two years means that for any custodial term over one year that is suspended, an operational period 
twice this length is not possible under the current regime.  
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In England and Wales, people subject to determinate sentences of 
imprisonment serve half of their sentence in custody and half in the community 
subject to post-custodial license conditions. Therefore, a person sentenced to 
two years of immediate imprisonment for domestic burglary would be required 
to serve one year in custody and one year in the community on license. Our 
proposal is that, if sentences are to be suspended, the operational period ought 
to last twice as long as the period of imprisonment, plus the equivalent 
additional time the person would have spent in the community subject to post-
custodial license conditions. In relation to our hypothetical domestic burglary 
case, therefore, this would translate to a suspended sentence with a two-year 
term of imprisonment and an operational period of three years (as opposed to 
the likely two-year operational period under the current sentencing 
framework). 
What might the likely consequences of an enhanced operational period be? 
First and foremost, it would increase the severity of the SSO. In this particular 
case, not only would the person subject to the SSO be required to abide by 
certain conditions in the community for an additional year, but during this time 
they would also be subject to breach and the possibility of imprisonment for the 
remainder of the sentence. Regarding our current case of someone convicted of 
domestic burglary and sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment with an 
operational period of three years, how much time in custody ought the person 
serve if they breach the SSO after precisely one year? One straightforward 
approach would be to allow every two months served in the community—
subject to the SSO—to equate to one month of imprisonment. This mirrors our 
suggestion that the operational period ought to last for double the length of the 
term of custody that would have been imposed had the sentence not been 
suspended. In relation to our example, therefore, if the SSO was breached after 
one year, the person who had breached the order would be required to serve a 
remaining six months in prison following termination, plus the additional twelve 
months subject to post-custodial license conditions, which would have been 
required had the sentence not been suspended. 
This recommendation, which we argue would bring the SSO more into line 
with the penal weight of the immediate terms of imprisonment these orders are 
designed to replace, is quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. The precise 
penal character of SSOs, however, depends not only on the duration of the 
operational period, but on the specific requirements attached to these orders. 
Nevertheless, we think it is appropriate that the courts and other criminal 
justice professionals retain the authority and discretion to shape the precise 
content of SSOs. While we do not favor an approach that mandates a specific 
number of requirements being attached to these orders, our second 
recommendation is designed to enhance the availability, and consequently the 
take-up, of rehabilitative requirements in particular. 
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2. Increase Investment in the Quality and Administration of SSOs 
Given an average annual cost of imprisonment of around £35,000 per person 
and an average annual cost of SSOs of around £4,300 per person,64 our 
proposals would continue to see SSOs costing the state significantly less than 
the sentences of immediate imprisonment they are designed to replace. Indeed, 
the additional costs of the enhanced operational periods may ultimately reduce 
costs, if they lead to the courts applying these sentences correctly and as they 
were originally intended: in place of sentences of immediate imprisonment as 
opposed to community orders. To reiterate, one of the likely reasons for the 
net-widening process described in this article is potential for the courts to 
perceive SSOs as lacking a level of punitive weight broadly equivalent to 
immediate sentences of imprisonment. As a result, the courts have largely used 
SSOs to displace community orders. If SSOs are revised so that their 
operational period is double that of the custodial term they are displacing—plus 
the additional period of time people would otherwise have served subject to 
post-custodial license in the community—it seems reasonable to expect that the 
courts will be more willing to use the SSOs as intended. 
In light of the considerable cost differentials, we think there is a strong case 
for investing additional money to enhance the quality and administration of 
SSOs. For example, as noted above, some of the requirements that are available 
in theory—such as alcohol treatment, attendance center requirements, and 
mental health treatment requirements—are unavailable in practice due to a lack 
of resources. As addressing problems around mental health and substance 
abuse can be integral to supporting people to refrain from crime,65 it would be 
prudent to use a proportion of the savings gained from displacing sentences of 
immediate imprisonment with SSOs to better fund and thereby increase the 
availability of these rehabilitative requirements. 
Increasing the availability of rehabilitative requirements not only has the 
potential to bring about reductions in reoffending, but also to enhance public 
and judicial confidence in these sanctions. Indeed, there are some notable 
examples of deterrence-based strategies being used in conjunction with the 
provision of considerable levels of training, employment and other forms of 
support, to divert people away from crime.66 SSOs have the potential to 
function in a similar manner to reduce the likelihood of reoffending, combining 
the deterrent threat of SSO termination, and consequent time in prison, with an 
enhanced level of support that better funded SSOs might provide in the 
 
 64.  NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, PROBATION: LANDSCAPE REVIEW (2014) 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Probation-landscape-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TPJ9-8ABZ]; PRISON REFORM TRUST, PRISON: THE FACTS: BROMLEY BRIEFINGS 
SUMMER 2017 (2017). 
 65.  Marie Needham et al., Association Between Three Different Cognitive Behavioral Alcohol 
Treatment Programs and Recidivism Rates Among Male Offenders: Findings From The United 
Kingdom, 39 ALCOHOL, CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1100 (2015). 
 66.  Anthony Braga & David Weisburd, The Effects of ‘Pulling Levers’ Focused Deterrence 
Strategies on Crime, 8 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1 (2012).  
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community. The broad and inclusive approach to sentencing rationales 
promoted by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Section 142(1) provides ample 
support for penal sanctions that attempt to reduce crime through deterrence, 
reform, and rehabilitation. 
D. Drawing Lessons from the English Experience 
The literature on the suspended sentence makes it clear that the structure of 
any such sanction, as well as its interaction with the sentencing regime in which 
it is embedded, determines its success or failure. A suspended sentence that 
works in one jurisdiction may fail in another. Unlike institutional imprisonment, 
the contours of which are relatively constant, the penological context of 
suspended sentences varies greatly. This may explain why the Australian 
versions have foundered while the English equivalent has flourished.67 
The experience in England makes it clear that a suspended sentence of 
imprisonment can be accommodated within the range of judicial options at 
sentencing. Critics of suspended sentences might have predicted a number of 
negative outcomes as a result of such a striking and sudden shift in sentencing 
practices, including an increase in crime and reoffending rates, widespread 
public opposition to the expanded use of the sanction, and a significant drop in 
the use of community orders as a result of net-widening. Two of these problems 
have not arisen to any significant degree; the latter requires further analysis 
before conclusions can be drawn with any confidence. Crime rates have been 
falling in recent years, while there has been little change in reoffending rates. 
Although no study has explicitly explored public reaction to the use of 
suspended sentences, the level of public confidence in sentencing increased 
during the period in which the volume of suspended sentences rose. In relation 
to the issue of net-widening, the evidence suggests an initial decarceration effect 
when the CJA 2003 removed the “exceptional circumstances” provision from 
the imposition of SSOs. While net-widening also appears to have taken place, 
the picture is not straightforward; in-depth scrutiny of sentencing data in the 
coming years is required before firm conclusions can be drawn on this issue. 
It is all very well to emphasize the conceptual complexities and legislative 
deficiencies of a given sanction, but perhaps it is worth considering one of the 
individuals on whom this order has been imposed. Sara Smith68 was convicted of 
excise tax evasion amounting to approximately £70,000, arising from a family 
business in which she had repeatedly made trips to the continent, returning with 
goods the value of which was not fully declared. Sara was a young mother with 
three young children, of whom one was an infant, and another had special 
needs. She had no prior convictions. At the time of sentencing, an SSO was only 
available if the court decided it was justified by exceptional circumstances. In 
light of the seriousness of the fraud and related aggravating factors, the trial 
 
 67.  Freiberg, supra note 51.   
 68.  R. v. Smith (Sara Jane) [2001] EWCA Crim 1476. 
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judge imposed twelve months immediate custody. Smith appealed her sentence, 
but the Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant’s circumstances were not 
exceptional and therefore upheld the term of immediate imprisonment. 
The defendant in this case was not a small fish caught up in the ever-
widening net created by a reformed sanction: she was an individual heading for 
prison, with the suspended sentence seen as a last resort. If an individual with 
this profile were sentenced today, it seems highly likely that the trial court 
would have imposed an SSO to prevent the defendant’s children being deprived 
of their mother as a result of her imprisonment.69 In the present penal climate, 
courts are unlikely to impose a community order in a case of this nature; the 
custody threshold would clearly be perceived to have been crossed.70 Returning 
to the previous “only in exceptional circumstances” regime, or abolishing the 
SSO altogether, would inevitably mean this woman would enter prison. This 
case illustrates both the current utility of a suspended sentence of 
imprisonment, as well as the wisdom of removing the exceptional circumstance 
requirement.  
V 
CONCLUSION 
Suspended sentences have the potential to play an important role in 
enabling courts to avoid institutionalizing people for relatively short terms of 
imprisonment. In order to do so, however, they must command the confidence 
of sentencers and a range of other stakeholders. The intention of our proposals 
is not to fundamentally alter the overall severity of sentencing in England and 
Wales, but to address some of the flaws and limitations regarding the content 
and implementation of this particular sanction. 
First, by enhancing the operational period of SSOs so that their duration is 
twice as long as the term of custody being suspended (plus an equivalent 
additional period of time that people would otherwise have served subject to 
post-custodial license in the community), our proposals would increase the 
punitive weight of SSOs. This would increase sentencers’ confidence in these 
sanctions. In turn, we think it is reasonable to expect that the courts would be 
 
 69.  The starting point sentence under the current guideline is 26 weeks for this profile of fraud, 
(FRAUD, BRIBERY AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES. DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE (SENTENCING 
COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 2014) but the presence of several aggravating factors would 
likely have resulted in a longer term of custody, at which point the question would be whether a 
suspended sentence order would be appropriate. To resolve this issue a court would turn to the 
Council’s 2016 guideline which as noted (supra note 28) states that one of the factors which would 
make an SSO appropriate is that imposition of immediate custody would result in significant harm to 
other parties, in this case the defendant’s children. 
 70.  By the courts at least. Many academic commentators and advocacy groups would likely take a 
different view. The public also may find some form of suspended sentence to be a more appropriate 
option, particularly if constructed to have greater impact upon the defendant. For example, one survey 
found most members of the public believed that being a main caretaker for children should result in a 
more lenient sentence. See Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough, Custody or Community? Exploring the 
Boundaries of Public Punitiveness in England and Wales, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 181 (2011). 
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more willing to impose SSOs in place of sentences of immediate imprisonment, 
rather than community orders as has largely been the case in recent years. By 
increasing the number of SSOs at the expense of sentences of immediate 
imprisonment, our proposals have the potential to significantly reduce both the 
economic costs associated with imprisonment as well as some of the human 
harms associated with institutionalization. Second, reinvesting some of these 
savings to increase the quality and availability of rehabilitative requirements, 
such as alcohol treatment, attendance centers, and mental health treatment, 
would ensure that these services were adequately funded and resourced, 
thereby enhancing both the quality of SSOs and the confidence of sentencers in 
these sanctions. 
In short, the English experience demonstrates that there is a role for a 
suspended sentence of imprisonment at sentencing, even when the statutory 
framework is far from perfect. That said, the current regime in England and 
Wales clearly requires amendment. Parliament should undertake appropriate 
reforms, particularly if research in the coming years suggests that the 
Sentencing Council’s guideline on the use of disposals has failed to correct the 
problem of net-widening identified in this and previous publications. 
 
